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TitleKnowing what we can"t believe
AuthorViedge, Nikolai
SubjectB Philosophy (General)
Date2004
TypeThesis
TypeNonPeerReviewed
Formattext
AbstractThe aim of this thesis is to examine what affect, if any, finding an argument both unanswerable yet unbelievable has on three purported first-person doxastic constraints. The three proposed constraints are the principle of truth, the principle of adequate reason and the principle of epistemic explanation. In Chapter 1, I lay out the claim of each of these constraints; differentiate them from one another, examine under what conditions they can be said to apply and provide what I take to be the strongest arguments for each of them. In Chapter 2, I explicate what I mean by finding an argument unanswerable yet unbelievable. In Chapters 3, 4 and 5, I detail how it is that finding an argument unanswerable yet unbelievable could constitute a threat to each of these constraints. I conclude that while the principle of adequate reason is undermined in the face of this threat, both the principle of truth and the principle of epistemic explanation fail to be undermined by this challenge.
Identifierhttp://eprints.ru.ac.za/1782/1/Viedge_MA_TR04-149.pdf
Identifier Viedge, Nikolai (2004) Knowing what we can"t believe. Masters thesis, Rhodes University.